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These two books have very similar goals: to introduce beginners, at 
undergraduate levels, to complex concepts and methods for the understanding 
and analysis of contemporary media. Both draw on research traditions and 
literatures from disciplines predating media studies as such (semiotics and 
ethnography respectively) but which are now very much part of the media 
analyst’s armoury. To that extent both are to be welcomed as either course texts 
or supplementary readings for introductory courses in media studies. There is, 
however, one thing they have in common, which I will introduce in due course, 
and which is, in my humble view, possibly the methodological problem haunting 
media and cultural studies today. 
 
 
1. 
 
Danesi’s job is no doubt the hardest of the two. It is notoriously difficult to teach 
semiotics to beginners. So many different varieties of semiotics are on sale today 
and not all of them are commensurable. Add to this the problem of applying so 
many distinct approaches to a plethora of different media (in this case: print, 
audio, film, TV, the internet and advertising), all of which are industries with 
histories that need at least some explication over and above their treatment as 
textual sites, and the task becomes herculean. How Danesi approaches his task is 
to leave the question of approach — of what constitutes semiotic analysis proper 
— well and truly open. This allows him a horses-for-courses brief that can even be 
stretched to encompass elements of psychoanalysis, mythological analysis, 
Schramm-type (SMCR) studies and other non-semiotic approaches. 
 
What holds all this together is the rather vague concept of representation, taken 
here, most frequently, in a quasi-cognitivist sense of mental contents. As Danesi 
makes clear from the start, the basic formula is X=Y, where X is some media 
element, Y is a thought construct (though it is also occasionally allowed to be 
purely material), and the equals sign translates not as ‘is identical with’ but as 
‘represents’ or ‘stands for’. 
 
We know that representation is a stock-in-trade concept for media and cultural 
studies, but also that it is radically undertheorised in those fields which are often 
— interdisciplinary as they claim to be — loathe to engage with the philosophical 
tradition that has been working on this very concept, as a concept, since the pre-
socratics. (An astonishing example in this respect is Hall’s Representation: 
Cultural Representations and Signifying Practice (1997) which ends up repeating 
Descartes for want of knowing him.) Danesi’s definition of ‘representation’, in this 
light, appears somewhat simplisitic: ‘the process of giving a form to some referent 
[Y?] with signs [X?]’ (p227). 
 
This allows a great deal of latitude for playing fast and loose with distinct theories 
of semiosis. Referents, accordingly, can transform into signifieds, signs into 
signifiers, and meaning(s) into signification(s). And vice versa. For example, we 
learn that Aristotle: 
 
defined the sign as consisting of three dimensions: (1) the physical part of 
the sign itself (e.g. the sounds that make up a word such a ‘rabbit’); (2) the 
referent to which it calls attention (a certain category of animal), (3) its 
evocation of a meaning (what the referent entails psychologically and 
socially). As we saw in the previous chapter, nowadays (1) is called the 
‘signifier’, (2) the ‘signified’, and (3) ‘signification’. (p29) 
 
The Saussurean terms are unfortnuate here. The Aristotelian trio might, at the 
limit, be contorted to map on to Peirce’s Representamen, Object and Interpretant; 
but the equation with Saussure neglects the latter’s radical insistence that 
semiotics confine itself to the sign-side of the sign-referent distinction (while not 
denying the existence of the referent) and to move ahead by taking both signifier 
and signified as sub-components of the sign as such, with ‘signification’ specified 
at their mutual relation. This is not a minor quibble with Danesi’s self-avowed 
‘“cut and paste” approach’ (p31). In the Saussurean model, especially in its later 
uptake by Greimas and the Paris School, signification (the ‘sign relation’) can be, 
but need not be, representational in character. This allows modes of thinking 
about semiosis leading well beyond X=Y representationalism, and in ways that 
are not so confusing to beginners as the ‘cut and paste’ approach. 
 
For all of these problems in, as it were, the theoretical basement of Danesi’s 
textbook, beginners will gain much from its actual analyses of media texts 
(interspersed with potted media histories). They will also, equally usefully, be 
gradually steered away from any remaining knee-jerk views about contemporary 
media as a ‘psychologically toxic’ ‘distraction factory’. 
 
 
2. 
 
Machin, by contrast, needs less conceptual baggage. His concern is to get 
beginners in media analysis to go out and actually do ethnographic work, to get 
off their elevated couches, as it were; to get down and explore what ordinary folk 
(especially audiences) actually do there in the media village. At the cornerstone of 
the book is what Machin calls ‘the ethnographic gaze’ — with ‘the gaze’ now re-
valorised as a positive research tool and Laura Mulvey et al confined to history’s 
rubbish-bin as mere theoreticism that ignores what ‘audiences themselves are 
thinking’ (p72). Still the untheorised ghost of representation walks abroad even 
here: 
 
What we ... need to do is to look at how the person in fact behaves in 
different settings. This is what the ethnographic gaze should be all about. 
We need to see people as social actors who, along with talking about the 
world in order make sense of it, are also concerned to find and indicate 
their own place in the world. And the way that people talk, as we have just 
seen, is strongly influenced by representations which are available to them 
in their culture. (p13) 
 
So, to be sure, the talk, Danesi’s X, is to be collected and inspected in some detail 
— and this talk is taken as part of a broader social ‘conversation’ that the mass 
media supposedly contribute to — but what it is inspected for is Danesi’s Y, 
represented stuff. For example, there is speculation about whether children’s talk 
about TV programs could be an indication of their actually saying what they 
believe adult researchers want to hear (p160); whether their surface talk could be 
an (unknowing) use of a Reithian model of public broadcasting (p160); or whether 
their ‘strange’ defences of mere entertainment as in fact educational could be a 
literal representation of their beliefs (p159), etc. Most of these speculations are 
doubted, but the ‘real’ situation with kids’ talk about TV is explicated as follows 
(in the context of a discussion about one child’s ambivalent talk about TV 
cartoons): 
 
What is Nikita’s real opinion or belief? Does she like cartoons or not? As 
we saw in the last chapter it is not productive to approach our data with 
that kind of question. What is important is that we acknowledge that 
Nikita, like other speakers, experiences herself through the alignments that 
she makes through her interactions. In both of these cases [the positive and 
negative remarks about cartoons] Nikita is able to present a particular kind 
of agency. (p162) 
 
And that presentation (or is it representation?) of a ‘kind of agency’ is then placed 
in the context of broader ‘discourses’ about childhood summarised (via Coward) 
as a ‘language of public responsibility and caring’ (p163). Hence: 
 
children are aware of all these discourses which suffuse the culture in 
which they live, which people use to talk about both television and 
children. This discourse appears to the children as common sense and as 
naturally reflecting the way the world is. (p163) 
 
So what children’s talk about television (X) actually represents (=) is a broader 
discourse about children themselves as ideal community members (Y), 
propagated, inter alia, by the very programs they are discussing in the study and 
programs like them. The Y-side of the equation has now become socially and 
‘discursively’ rather than psychologically ghostly. But it remain a mere 
representationalist or interpretivist speculation. 
 
Early on in the book, citing his disciplinary allegiances, Machin makes passing 
reference to Harold Garfinkel, stating that his (Machin’s) approach is ‘strongly 
influenced by ethnomethodology’ (p38). But one of the most incisive lessons of 
ethnomethodology — aside from its rejection of the standardised aggregationist 
methods of formal social science (see Machin pp81-89) — is that there are deep 
and abiding problems with assuming a representationalist picture of how social 
order actually works. Ethnomethodology, that is, does not go looking for ‘what 
more’ (Y) lies beneath the ordinary everyday methods of order production (X). It 
does not need to because they are available in material audio-visual forms (e.g., 
talk) to all practically-oriented members going about their lives. 
 
In Ethnomethodology’s Program (2002), Garfinkel amplifies this position from the 
earlier (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. The ordinary methods that he wants 
to investigate, he writes, ‘preclude the use of proxies. They are without the 
possibility that indicators can stand for them or that indicators can be interpreted 
to exhibit their contents’ (p111). Ethnomethodology. then, involves ‘avoiding the 
design and administration of generic representations and their methodologized 
dopes’ (p117). ‘Nowhere here’, he continues later, ‘are we talking of ... 
signs/indications/marks/codes/symbols’ (p161). Much less should everyday 
practices be transformed into analysts’ occasions for ‘finding and reading signs’ 
(p160) of mysteriously hidden ‘knowledge and beliefs’ (p140). 
 
This is something that media ethnography and media semiotics could well attend 
to. There are ways of laying the ghost of representationalism — and beginners 
especially need to know about them. Jalbert’s edited collection, Media Studies: 
Ethnomethodological Approaches (2000) is one place to start. 
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